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The notion of the ‘philosophy of x’, which has recently tended to become part of many subjects, 
from music to management, tends to obscure a range of important issues. The idea behind it 
seems to be that, by designating one’s reflections on a subject as the ‘philosophy’ of whatever it is 
one is reflecting about, one achieves some kind of higher insight. Such an approach arguably grants 
too much to a subject whose main manifestation is actually endless disagreement on fundamental 
issues. In the light of this less flattering view of philosophy I want to suggest that we may 
sometimes achieve more by thinking of some of our practices, particularly in the aesthetic domain, 
as manifestations of what philosophy might become, rather than just thinking of those practices 
as objects of philosophical analysis. If, following A.W. Moore (2011), we think of metaphysics as to 
do with ‘making maximal sense of things’ and with ‘making sense of making sense’, it is worth 
considering whether the making of sense may in fact not always best be achieved by objectifying 
what we do in the form of propositional claims. Sense-making may instead inhere in performances 
which reveal aspects of the world that are hidden by dominant practices and assumptions, 
including the assumptions of some philosophy as presently practised. Such philosophy can rather 
unreflectively work on the assumption that establishing what things really are must always be the 
prior philosophical task, and that philosophy has privileged insight into what things really are. It 
might seem surprising to question such an assumption, but even a glance at the differences, both 
during the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, in conceptions of what things 
really are, can suggest that, rather than just adding another such conception, a meta-reflection on 
the instability of such conceptions may reveal something important about the role of philosophy.  
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Questioning of the idea of ‘the philosophy of x’ is not new. In his Philosophy of Art of 1802-3, 
Schelling asserts: ‘it is to be expected that people set up a philosophy of the horse drawn cart as 
well, and that in the end there will be as many philosophies as there are objects at all, and that one 
will completely lose philosophy itself because of all the philosophies there are’ (Schelling 1856, I/5: 
365). Schelling was motivated by the idea of philosophy as a single system which unified the 
different and increasingly diverging ways in which the modern world was being understood. 
Philosophy would do so by seeing how these differing kinds of understanding related to ‘the 
Absolute’, to the fact that thought and reality could be shown to be ‘identical’. The way the world is 
manifest in such forms of understanding, from the arts to the natural sciences to philosophy, is 
seen in terms of different preponderances of ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ (see Bowie 1993), art being 
philosophically important because of the way it incorporates ‘ideal’ intelligibility in ‘real’ material 
forms. Such systematic ideas have fallen prey to the advances of the individual sciences, which 
seem to resist incorporation into a unified philosophical picture, and to the awareness of the 
danger of neglecting cultural differences via too narrow conceptions of rationality. But Schelling ’s 
suspicion of inflating x into something which is a specifically philosophical object is still significant. 
The need to negotiate the conflicts between different domains of sense-making, rather than just 
accepting the fact of their differences and trying to establish a philosophy for each domain, 
remains central to philosophy today, for example in debates over the conflict between the 
‘manifest’ and ‘scientific’ images of the world, or in debates between analytical and European 
understandings of key issues.  
In the sort of approach to philosophy I am interested in, the apparent failure to achieve the aims 
of traditional metaphysics itself becomes a major focus of reflection. The crude fact which gives 
rise to this focus is that in philosophy the investment of intellectual resources leads to wholesale 
disagreement on fundamental questions, of a kind absent from significant areas of the natural 
sciences. Disagreement in philosophy has, of course, been constitutively present since its very 
beginnings, and one should not overestimate consensus in the sciences. However, what most 
obviously distinguishes the modern from the pre-modern situation is precisely that, at the same 
time as the sciences deliver more and more practically useable theories in ways they had not done 
in the pre-modern era, philosophy generates more and more disagreement on the most basic 
issues, and becomes heavily focused on epistemological scepticism (see Dewey 2012 for a brilliant 
account of this situation). This eventually leads to questions about the very nature of the 
philosophical enterprise, including the idea that philosophy has reached its ‘end’, for example, as 
the Vienna Circle will suggest, because metaphysical questions will be given scientific solutions or 
revealed as meaningless.  
There is an instructive split in contemporary philosophy, between the aim of reviving some kind of 
foundational metaphysical enterprise, and the need to come to terms with the possibility that such 
an enterprise has revealed itself as no longer addressing what matters in the world we actually 
inhabit. The new analytical metaphysicians, for example, hold to the idea of establishing of ‘what 
fundamental kinds of things there are and what properties and relations they have ’ (Williamson 
2007, 19). Metaphysics so defined can be contrasted with Moore’s idea that metaphysics has to do 
with making maximal sense of things and making sense of making sense, which opens up a very 
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different field of questions. The new metaphysical approach spends its time on thought 
experiments and the like, because philosophy is seen as a conceptual discipline. From the 
perspective of some versions of the alternative approach, this kind of philosophising is inherently 
questionable. If, following Kant, a concept is a rule for identifying an object, or, following Richard 
Rorty, a regular use of mark or noise to coordinate social action, the metaphysical enterprise as 
seen by Timothy Williamson and others lacks any plausible justification. It fails to connect 
conceptual questions to questions about what we actually do and what happens in the world, 
preferring to create abstract scenarios and issues, in the name of a rigour that is largely achieved 
by excluding the complexity of how the notional metaphysical issue of ‘fundamental things’ is 
manifest in the human world. Essentially, the approach attempts to ape the analytical procedures 
of the natural sciences while excluding those sciences’ insistence on detailed observational 
evidence. That the approach can offer little to virtually any discipline in the humanities almost goes 
without saying, and is confirmed by the growing split between such analytical philosophers and 
the rest of the humanities.  
It is well known, in contrast, that communication between the humanities and the major directions 
in European philosophy has become an ineliminable part of the contemporary landscape. The 
paucity of the actual results of seeking to establish what ‘fundamental kinds of things there are’ by 
metaphysical reflection contrasts sharply with exploration, for example, of the nature and 
significance of things in phenomenology. The most obvious fact about the contrast is that figures 
in the phenomenological tradition, like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, see art as essential to 
philosophy, in a way which is inconceivable in the narrower versions of contemporary metaphysics 
in the analytical tradition. The question is therefore how this philosophical attention to art relates 
to issues of performance.  
So far we have seen a basic division in conceptions that can be summed up in terms of the 
distinction between the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ genitive. In the former the philosophy ‘of x’ 
can be seen in terms of how x itself makes philosophical sense, meaning sense that discloses the 
world in ways that affect, illuminate, change, and reveal what we care about (on this with respect 
to music, see Bowie 2007). In the latter, the philosophy of x makes x the object of conceptual 
determination: this can be exemplified in the way that the analytical philosophy of art is often just 
an exercise in ontology, which seeks to establish the criteria, for example, of a ‘musical work’, on 
the basis of whether it is the score, a performance, all performances, etc. Such objectification can 
all too easily be inimical to the kind of sense that is central to art, where, as the case of music makes 
clear, the resistance to conceptual determination may sometimes be precisely what makes 
something aesthetically significant. Does this mean, then, that there is no value in conceptual 
reflection about issues in art? That would evidently be very mistaken, but conceptual clarification 
may fail to get to the heart of the philosophical import of art, because the sense characteristic of 
art is inseparable from its manifestation in the specificity of art itself. The question is what 
philosophical significance is to be attributed to such sense. Stanley Cavell’s idea that knowing 
things is not the only way to relate to them points in a different direction and to more productive 
possibilities for philosophical exploration. Axel Honneth suggests that Lukács, Adorno, Heidegger, 
and John Dewey seek an alternative to the epistemological model that privileges the ‘ruling idea, 
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according to which an epistemic subject stands opposite the world in a neutral manner’ (Honneth 
2005, 31). For Heidegger such a neutral stance only reveals the world of ‘entities’, when the vital 
issue is how the ‘being’ of the world is understood, and how it is that philosophy has lost sight of 
this in the name of objectifying the world.  
It is in this perspective that reflection on philosophy and performance can best be located. The 
idea is to engage with the practices via which we make sense, not primarily as objects to be given 
a philosophical characterisation, but rather as ways in which the blind-spots in other practices, 
including in philosophy itself, can be made manifest. Heidegger’s insistence on a radical 
introduction of finitude into philosophy involves a reminder of why many things we do make little 
sense, and a call to attend to the real sources of how meaning arises (see, e.g., Heidegger 1979). 
The focus on the aspects of art which can be objectively grasped, as though only truths that are 
immune to history really matter, draws attention away from the fact that the meanings which 
sustain our lives are more often embedded in practices whose significance we may come to ignore. 
Getting to the point of being aware of that significance may not best be achieved by discursive 
means, which points to why the role of performance in human culture can be so central. 
Therapeutic progress, for example, may not consist in new discursive self-knowledge but rather in 
a transformation of our ability to inhabit our world that comes about through performative 
articulation of the source of one’s neuroses. 
Such a view involves taking seriously the performative status of whatever we mean by philosophy. 
J.L. Austin, and, later, Jürgen Habermas offer a philosophy of performativity which reveals the way 
in which whole dimensions of language had become hidden to many philosophers by the 
predominant analytical focus on the semantics of constative utterances and the failure to see 
communication as the performance of an action. We should, though, also think in terms of the 
performativity of philosophy. The contentious point here is that in this view anything can be 
‘philosophical’, if it makes the kind of sense that enables us or compels us to orient and conduct 
our lives in new ways. By making new sense or making sense where there was none, any cultural 
practice may do what we ask of philosophy in this respect. At this point one has to stress that the 
sense in question should not be trivial – Moore, as we saw, thinks of metaphysics in terms of 
‘maximal’ sense-making – which is one reason why Heidegger and others focus on important art 
to suggest the significance of ‘world-disclosure’ for philosophy. Art is here a ‘happening of truth’ 
that ‘unconceals’ an otherwise hidden aspect of a world or changes the very sense of what the 
world is. The rigour required in such views comes about via the realisation that making sense is 
both massively conditioned by our location in historical horizons over which we have no final 
control, and by the fragility of sense-making in the face of the end of metaphysics in the ‘Platonic’ 
sense. Transcendence, which was sought by traditional philosophy in a timeless view of 
fundamental truths about the world, can now be sought in different ways. Heidegger claims in ‘The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, and Dewey implies in Experience and Nature, that the 
physical sciences are becoming the modern form of traditional metaphysics, because the 
mathematical account of the functioning of the physical world is inherently a-temporal. This 
situation leads to a questioning of philosophy as it is traditionally conceived, and points to other 
ways of conceiving the philosophical task, such as seeing transcendence as linked to practices that 
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are often not essentially cognitively oriented, and so are not necessarily subject to the same kinds 
of contradictions that are the primary feature of so much academic philosophy.  
Some of Habermas’ recent work has focused on ritual in relation to the limitations of the thesis 
that secularisation is a universal accompaniment to modernity. What is at issue in ritual can be 
seen as the performance of sense, because the meanings which rituals engender are inseparable 
from the performances of the rituals themselves. By analysing the sense enacted in a ritual in 
objectifying terms, ritual can - as modernity shows - often be destroyed as a sense-making practice. 
This situation is a version of what lay behind Max Weber’s idea of ‘disenchantment’ (see Weber 
2004). Something analogous is implicit in Hegel’s idea that art no longer ‘fulfils our highest need’ in 
the way that he thinks philosophy, which he links to modern science and modern law, can, because 
it is less tied to the specifics of the empirical world (Hegel 1965 Volume 1, 25). However, in a manner 
related to the way religion seems to resist secularisation, art in modernity does anything but 
disappear from the repertoire of sense-making practices, as the development of music in particular 
shows (see Bowie 2007). With respect to performance the link to ritual lies in the shared 
irreducibility to discursive cashing-out of all the sense generated in performance. Habermas 
suggests that 
Reasons and discursive thinking admittedly form the centre of mind that operates 
in dependence on language, and above all they form the vehicle of the learning 
human mind; but the space of meaning incorporated in symbols still stretches into 
a periphery of dimensions of sense which extends beyond the space of explicitly 
available reasons (Habermas 2012, 76).  
This is because ‘the space of reasons is embedded in a horizon of sense which is not verbalisable 
or is pre-predicative’ (ibid.: 74), which can only be manifested in things like performance, where 
one participates in sense, rather than seeing it as something fully realised in the ways we talk about 
that sense. The question is what significance this horizon has, and how best to understand it in 
relation to the dominant forms of philosophy. This is territory most effectively – and often 
problematically – opened up by Heidegger, and we are far from an adequate understanding of how 
Heidegger can be used to shift the boundaries of philosophy. That seems to me one major task for 
‘performance philosophy’. 
Philosophy, then, is not to be regarded solely as mapping out the space of reasons: that it must 
attempt to do this is obvious, and I am not arguing for a wholesale abandonment of discursive 
rationality, just trying better to assess its status in the light of the failure to arrive at anything 
resembling definitive theories. The point is that the content of reasons also depends on horizons 
of sense that are not grasped by inferentially articulated claims, and are, for example, embodied 
in the performance of ritual and aesthetic practices that are constitutive of a culture. The idea that 
performance can open up philosophical space which discursive philosophical approaches cannot 
should not be seen as involving a new metaphysics as a characterisation of ‘entities’ in the analytical 
manner. Instead, it should be considered as an exploration of horizons of sense that can be 
obscured by dominant cultural forms of attention, in the way that the work of Heidegger and 
others in the phenomenological tradition can be used to suggest. Habermas’ awareness of the 
 
 
56 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 1 (2015) 
neglected elements in his previous accounts of communication, and his consequent attention to 
participatory sense-making has to do with a lack in his earlier work of an adequate approach to 
what makes us invest in sense. Heidegger and Wittgenstein regard sense-making as rationally 
groundless (see Braver 2012): much that makes meaning possible can be hidden by the ways in 
which philosophy has tried to ground meaning, and therefore must be sought in non-discursive 
forms of the kind associated with performance. 
 What is meant here can be exemplified by a crucial element of musical performance, but also of 
most significant art and, indeed, of human life: rhythm. As an ‘entity’, in Heidegger’s sense, rhythm 
is just repetition that can be described as a temporal sequence of physical phenomena. Such a 
description does not grasp anything of the ‘being’ of rhythm. Schelling gets at the ‘being’ of rhythm 
when he says it is ‘the transformation of a succession which is in itself meaningless into a significant 
one’ (Schelling 1856-61, I/5: 493). Both he and Hegel realise that self-consciousness is therefore 
linked to rhythm, because if experience is not to be just a chaos of different moments it must unify 
the multiplicity which the subject encounters. Such unification, especially since Kant, is generally 
seen in terms of the syntheses produced in judgments on the basis of the transcendental unity of 
apperception; but even Kant suggests there must be a ground of synthesis which is prior to explicit 
judgment, the ‘schema’. Schemata are ‘nothing but determinations of time a priori according to rules’ 
(ibid.), which already suggests a connection to rhythm as the creation of significant temporal 
succession (see Bowie 2007 Chapter 3 for the details, and an account of how the early German 
Romantics developed the idea of rhythm as the ground of sense-making). David Bell sees the 
schema as ‘a spontaneous, blind subjective awareness of intrinsic but inarticulable meaning’ (Bell 
1987, 241). If we take rhythm as fundamental to art, as a form of what Adorno terms ‘judgmentless 
synthesis’, the performance of rhythm, be it in music, dance, theatre, or any of the other arts – the 
rhythm of a prose style can, for example, be vital to its success – takes on a world-disclosing 
function.  
Now it is not that we can’t analyse and conceptualise the functioning of rhythm in many informative 
ways: doing that plays a legitimate role in traditional philosophical and critical approaches to the 
arts. However, the very ability to do so can itself be shown to be grounded in the basic generation 
of significance by succession that constitutes rhythm: in much music this, crucially, has a somatic 
dimension, involving libidinal investment, which is largely lost as the significance becomes an 
object of analysis. The awareness of a loss involved in the generation of objectivity via processes 
of identification founded on rhythm can suggest why, in modernity, as more and more of the world 
is objectified, a focus on aesthetic modes of sense-making often develops, in order to counter a 
divorce between affective and embodied understandings, and the world seen in objective terms. 
The kind of sense involved in rhythm is not reducible to the ways in which we analyse it, and has 
to be experienced in the motivated engagement with specific manifestations of rhythm. Such 
engagement, as the history of jazz shows, fuels a continuing revitalisation of rhythm by innovation 
which often makes no sense in terms of the existing codified ways of grasping rhythm, and so 
opens up new dimensions of sense. The drive for innovative sense is what is philosophically most 
significant here, and such innovation comes about through the nature of creative performance. 
Honneth’s observation, cited above, that modern philosophy needs an alternative to ‘an epistemic 
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subject [standing] opposite the world in a neutral manner’ points to a subject whose very capacity 
to make sense of its world is constituted by its involvement in dynamic practices which are part of 
the world it inhabits and which are sustained by new developments. 
Many debates in philosophical aesthetics endlessly circle around the issue of how much is located 
on the subject-side and how much on the object-side in our engagement with art: is beauty, for 
example, a property of artworks or is it just present in the subject contemplating the work? In the 
model suggested here, this split, which derives from the epistemic perspective, is seen as obscuring 
the fact that aesthetic sense is generated in the world in a manner which becomes 
incomprehensible from a perspective focused on the epistemic concern to overcome the notional 
subject-object split. The very historicity of what beauty is seen to be makes it impossible to locate 
it either as a purely subjective phenomenon or as some kind of objective property. The idea of a 
subject-object split should not, as Adorno suggests (see Bowie 2013), just be abandoned, insofar 
as it is a vital indication of the nature of modern life that, even as we gain more and more 
warrantable knowledge, our sense of our connection to the world becomes problematic. However, 
a decisive aspect of performance both for performer and audience is that it enables us to inhabit 
a world that makes sense by the very nature of our participation in it. That sense may often become 
ideological or can involve self-deception, but it also perennially involves the possibility of freeing 
oneself from distorted relationships to one’s world. At a time when the legitimacy of the study of 
the arts is often questioned in the name of the advance of scientific explanation or of economic 
imperatives, performance philosophy can be a resource for remembering that what constitutes 
meaningful existence is not primarily dependent on what we know or possess, but depends rather 
on the quality of our participation in sense-making practices. 
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